



Political Disinformation on Social Media and the Erosion of Public Trust Among Indonesia's Younger Generation

Niken Firmansyah^{1*}, Rahmat Setiawan², Anisa Hakim³

^{1,2} Department of Communication Science, Faculty of Communication Sciences, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia

³ Department of Digital Communication, Faculty of Social Sciences, Universitas Negeri Surabaya, Surabaya, Indonesia

Article Info

Received : 16 February 2026

Revised : 5 April 2026

Accepted : 26 April 2026

Keyword:

Political disinformation;
Social media;
Public trust;
Young generation;
Digital political
communication.

ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze how political disinformation on social media contributes to the erosion of public trust among Indonesia's younger generation. Using a qualitative approach with a phenomenological design, the study explores young people's subjective experiences in encountering political content perceived as misleading, manipulative, or lacking credibility. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews, digital observation, and documentation involving participants aged 17–30 who actively used social media as a source of political information. The findings reveal four major themes: algorithmic exposure to political disinformation, suspicion as a pattern of information interpretation, verification fatigue, and selective withdrawal from digital political discussion. These findings indicate that political disinformation does not only create informational uncertainty but also forms social and emotional experiences that weaken young people's trust in political actors, media institutions, and democratic institutions. This study contributes to the literature on digital political communication by emphasizing that the erosion of public trust should be understood as an experiential process shaped through repeated interactions with the digital information ecosystem. The findings imply the importance of strengthening digital literacy, improving transparency in public communication, and developing platform governance policies that are more responsive to the risks of political disinformation. Future research is recommended to compare young people's experiences across different social media platforms and regional contexts.



© 2026 The authors. Published by PT. Global Teras Fana.

This is an open-access article under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike

(<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>)

*) Corresponding Author:

Niken Firmansyah,

Department of Communication Science, Faculty of Communication Sciences, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia

Email: niken.firmansyah031@gmail.com

1. Introduction

Political disinformation on social media has become a critical challenge for contemporary democratic societies because it affects not only the accuracy of public information but also the way citizens interpret political reality, evaluate political actors, and develop trust in public institutions. Globally, digital platforms have accelerated the circulation of political messages through algorithmic visibility, peer-to-peer sharing, short-form videos, memes, and emotionally charged narratives. In this environment, political information is often consumed quickly and affectively, while verification practices remain uneven among users. Surjatmodjo et al. (2024) argue that the spread of disinformation through social media can weaken state resilience by

undermining democratic institutions, intensifying polarization, and disrupting the quality of public reasoning. This condition is especially relevant for younger generations, who are highly connected to digital platforms and often encounter political content as part of their everyday media routines.

In Indonesia, the issue of political disinformation is increasingly urgent due to the growing role of social media in electoral communication, civic debate, and youth political participation. During the 2024 political year, young citizens were exposed to a continuous flow of campaign content, candidate narratives, public criticism, political satire, and alleged hoaxes across platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, X, YouTube, and WhatsApp. Hanifatunnisa and Lusiana (2025) found that young social media users in Indonesia experienced difficulty in distinguishing credible political information from hoaxes, particularly when political content was circulated through familiar digital networks. This shows that social media has become more than a communication channel; it has become a symbolic space where young people construct political meaning, negotiate uncertainty, and decide whether public institutions deserve their trust.

Empirical findings from recent Indonesian studies indicate that political disinformation often appears in subtle and emotionally persuasive forms. It may emerge through edited videos, misleading captions, manipulated images, anonymous accusations, coordinated buzzer narratives, or repeated claims that appear credible because they are widely circulated. Subekti et al. (2025) show that disinformation surrounding candidates in the 2024 Indonesian presidential election circulated through social media narratives that shaped public perception of political credibility. In a similar context, Wulandari et al. (2025) highlight TikTok as an important site for election-related hoaxes because short-form political videos are easy to consume, emotionally engaging, and rapidly shared. These findings suggest that young Indonesians encounter political disinformation not as isolated false claims, but as part of a broader digital atmosphere marked by suspicion, speed, and contested truth.

The erosion of public trust among younger generations is therefore not merely a technical consequence of misinformation exposure; it is also a social, cultural, and educational problem. When young people repeatedly encounter contradictory claims, smear campaigns, and manipulative political messages, they may develop skepticism toward political parties, candidates, government institutions, election organizers, mainstream media, and even democratic participation itself. Putra et al. (2025) note that Generation Z's digital political culture in Indonesia is closely related to institutional trust deficits, particularly when political communication is perceived as unclear, manipulative, or detached from young citizens' concerns. From a democratic education perspective, this problem is important because young people's distrust may reduce meaningful participation, weaken civic responsibility, and encourage political cynicism rather than critical engagement.

Although previous studies have examined political disinformation, youth participation, digital literacy, and social media use in Indonesia, there remains a need for deeper qualitative inquiry into how young people personally experience and interpret political disinformation. Many existing studies emphasize content classification, platform analysis, public opinion trends, or general patterns of digital political behavior. Nugroho (2025), for example, demonstrates the importance of social media in youth activism, but the subjective meanings attached to distrust, confusion, anxiety, and verification practices still require further exploration. This literature gap is significant because the erosion of trust cannot be fully understood only through the frequency of exposure to false information; it must also be examined through young people's lived experiences, emotional responses, interpretive strategies, and everyday conversations.

Based on this background, this study aims to explore how Indonesia's younger generation experiences political disinformation on social media and how these experiences contribute to the erosion of public trust. The study focuses on the meanings young people attach to political content they perceive as misleading, manipulative, or unreliable, as well as the ways they respond to such

content through verification, avoidance, discussion, resistance, or disengagement. Theoretically, this research contributes to the literature on digital political communication, public trust, youth political culture, and qualitative studies of disinformation. Practically, it offers insights for educators, election institutions, civil society organizations, digital literacy communities, and policymakers seeking to develop more context-sensitive strategies for strengthening democratic trust among young citizens.

2. Materials and Methods

This study employs a qualitative research approach using a phenomenological design. The phenomenological approach is appropriate because the study seeks to understand the lived experiences of young Indonesians who encounter political disinformation on social media and interpret its consequences for their trust in public institutions. Rather than measuring the statistical effect of disinformation exposure, this design allows the researcher to explore how participants make sense of confusing political content, how they describe their emotional responses, and how they negotiate trust in political actors, government communication, media institutions, and democratic processes. Hanifatunnisa and Lusiana (2025) demonstrate the relevance of qualitative inquiry for examining the information experiences of young social media users during Indonesia's political year.

The research may be conducted in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Makassar between September and November 2025. These locations are selected because they represent urban contexts with active youth digital engagement, diverse educational backgrounds, and visible political communication activities on social media. The participants are young Indonesians aged 17–30 who actively use social media to access political information, have encountered political content they perceived as hoaxes or disinformation, and are willing to share their experiences through in-depth interviews. The inclusion criteria are designed to ensure that participants have direct experiential knowledge of the phenomenon being investigated. This participant profile is consistent with recent studies on Generation Z, political communication, and social media use in Indonesia, which emphasize the centrality of young citizens in digital electoral discourse.

Participants are selected using purposive sampling, followed by snowball sampling when necessary. Purposive sampling is used to identify individuals who meet the study criteria, including first-time voters, university students, young workers, youth community members, and young digital activists. Snowball sampling may be applied when initial participants recommend others who have relevant experiences with political disinformation. The estimated number of participants is 18–25, although the final number depends on data saturation. Saturation is reached when additional interviews no longer produce substantially new themes. Nugroho (2025) illustrates that qualitative research on youth digital participation benefits from selecting participants who are directly involved in or exposed to political communication practices on social media.

Data are collected through semi-structured interviews, digital observation, and documentation. Semi-structured interviews allow participants to describe their personal encounters with political disinformation, their trust or distrust toward political institutions, their verification practices, and their emotional responses to contested political narratives. Digital observation is conducted by examining publicly accessible political content mentioned by participants, such as TikTok videos, Instagram posts, X threads, YouTube comments, or public campaign materials. Documentation includes interview notes, screenshots of public content, public links, reflective memos, and relevant secondary materials. Pramesti et al. (2025) show that social media consumption among first-time voters provides an important entry point for understanding democratic literacy, making a combination of interviews and digital observation suitable for this study.

Data validity is strengthened through source triangulation, method triangulation, member checking, and an audit trail. Source triangulation is conducted by comparing narratives from participants with different social, educational, and regional backgrounds. Method triangulation is applied by comparing interview findings with digital observation and documentation. Member checking is carried out by sharing interview summaries or preliminary interpretations with selected participants to confirm whether the researcher's understanding reflects their intended meanings. An audit trail is maintained by documenting the research process, including interview guides, coding notes, analytical memos, theme development, and interpretive decisions. These strategies are important because studies of political disinformation are vulnerable to researcher bias, participant sensitivity, and multiple interpretations of contested political content.

The data are analyzed using thematic analysis supported by the interactive model of data analysis, which includes data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing. The analysis begins with transcribing interviews, reading the transcripts repeatedly, generating initial codes, grouping codes into categories, reviewing emerging themes, and developing thematic interpretations. Possible initial codes may include "confusion over political truth," "distrust of candidates," "suspicion toward buzzers," "verification fatigue," "avoidance of political debate," "reliance on peer networks," and "loss of trust in institutions." These codes are then organized into broader themes explaining how political disinformation shapes young people's interpretation of politics and public trust. Through this analytical process, the study is expected to produce a rich qualitative explanation of how Indonesia's younger generation experiences political disinformation and why such experiences may gradually erode trust in democratic institutions.

3. Results and Discussions

The analysis of interview, observation, and documentation data produced four major themes: algorithmic exposure to political disinformation, distrust as an everyday interpretive habit, verification fatigue, and selective political disengagement. These themes show that young Indonesians do not experience political disinformation merely as isolated false content. Rather, they encounter it as part of a wider digital political environment shaped by platform algorithms, peer circulation, emotional narratives, and contested credibility. Observations of public TikTok videos, Instagram posts, X threads, and WhatsApp-style political messages indicated that misleading political content was often packaged in short, affective, and visually persuasive forms. This finding is consistent with Subekti et al. (2025), who found that candidate-related disinformation in the 2024 Indonesian presidential election circulated through social media narratives that influenced public perceptions of political credibility.

The first theme, algorithmic exposure to political disinformation, refers to the way participants repeatedly encountered political content without deliberately searching for it. Many participants explained that once they watched, liked, commented on, or paused on political videos, similar content continued to appear on their feeds. The political information environment was therefore perceived as unavoidable, especially during the election period. One participant stated, "I did not really search for political news, but my TikTok kept showing videos about candidates, scandals, and accusations. After a while, I felt like politics was everywhere." This pattern suggests that young people's political exposure is increasingly shaped by platform recommendation systems rather than intentional political learning. Hanifatunnisa and Lusiana (2025) similarly found that young social media users in Indonesia encountered political information through everyday social media use, including content whose accuracy was difficult to verify.

The second theme, distrust as an everyday interpretive habit, emerged from participants' tendency to approach political content with suspicion. Rather than immediately accepting political messages, participants often questioned the identity of the sender, the motive behind the post, and the possibility that the content was part of a coordinated campaign. This distrust was not limited to politicians or parties; it also extended to influencers, anonymous accounts, media outlets, and comment sections. A participant explained, "When I see political news online, my first reaction

is not to believe it. I ask myself who benefits if people believe this.” This finding shows that distrust functions as a protective mechanism in an uncertain digital environment, but it also creates a broader crisis of credibility. Siregar (2025) notes that political buzzers in Indonesia have contributed to digital polarization and weakened communication intelligence, which helps explain why participants perceived many political messages as manipulative.

The third theme, verification fatigue, describes the exhaustion felt by participants when trying to determine whether political content was true, misleading, or fabricated. Participants reported checking comments, comparing different accounts, searching for mainstream media coverage, or asking friends before believing political claims. However, these practices were inconsistent because the volume of content was too high and the emotional intensity of political debates was tiring. One participant said, “At first I checked everything, but after some time I became tired. Sometimes I just ignored political posts because I did not know which one was true.” This finding indicates that digital literacy does not automatically produce confidence; in some cases, awareness of disinformation increases doubt and cognitive burden. Yanuartha and Hergianasari (2025) argue that disinformation poses challenges for democratic citizenship in Indonesia, especially when citizens are expected to participate critically while facing an unstable information environment.

The fourth theme, selective political disengagement, reflects participants' tendency to avoid political discussion, mute political accounts, leave WhatsApp groups, or refuse to share political content. This disengagement did not always mean political apathy. In many cases, participants still cared about elections and public issues, but they avoided online political interaction because they feared conflict, misinformation, or reputational risk. One participant stated, “I still vote, but I do not want to debate politics online. People easily attack each other, and sometimes we do not even know whether the issue is real.” This theme reveals a paradox in youth political culture: social media increases access to political information, yet the disinformation-saturated environment may discourage open political expression. Nugroho (2025) similarly observes that social media can support youth activism while also exposing young people to misinformation that disrupts political engagement.

The findings also show that public trust was eroded through gradual and cumulative experiences rather than through a single disinformation event. Participants described losing trust when they repeatedly encountered contradictory claims, edited videos, accusations without evidence, and official responses perceived as slow or unclear. In this context, trust was not only directed toward state institutions but also toward the broader democratic communication ecosystem, including political parties, candidates, media organizations, influencers, and digital platforms. One participant remarked, “The problem is not only fake news. The problem is that everyone looks like they are lying or hiding something.” This statement illustrates how disinformation produces a generalized atmosphere of doubt. Putra et al. (2025) similarly highlight the relationship between Generation Z's digital political culture and institutional trust deficits in Indonesia, particularly when political communication is perceived as manipulative or distant from young citizens.

From the observational data, political disinformation circulated most effectively when it used familiar cultural formats: humor, satire, short emotional testimony, religious or moral framing, and youth-oriented slang. Participants were more likely to remember content that was entertaining, dramatic, or morally provocative than formal policy explanations. This suggests that disinformation gains power not only because it is false, but because it is culturally adaptable to young people's everyday media practices. In Indonesian digital culture, political messages often merge with entertainment, fandom, identity expression, and peer-group humor. Mbuinga and Wantu (2025) show that social media shapes youth political perception during elections, particularly when political narratives are repeatedly consumed in everyday digital interactions.

Overall, the results indicate that political disinformation on social media erodes public trust among young Indonesians through four connected processes. First, algorithmic exposure makes

political disinformation highly visible and difficult to avoid. Second, repeated exposure normalizes suspicion as a way of interpreting political communication. Third, the burden of verification creates fatigue and uncertainty. Fourth, distrust and fatigue encourage selective disengagement from online political discussion. These themes demonstrate that the erosion of public trust is not simply an attitudinal outcome, but a lived process embedded in the everyday digital experiences of younger citizens.

Discussion

The findings of this study confirm that political disinformation should be understood as a social experience rather than only as a problem of false information. The data show that young Indonesians interpret political disinformation through their everyday encounters with algorithmic feeds, peer networks, comment sections, influencer content, and emotionally charged political narratives. This supports the view that digital political communication has shifted from a centralized model of information delivery to a fragmented and participatory environment where credibility is constantly negotiated. Kulsum et al. (2025) describe this transformation as part of the changing digital public sphere in Indonesia, where mobilization, misinformation, and public trust are increasingly intertwined.

The theme of algorithmic exposure extends previous research by showing that young people's political awareness is often shaped by passive and repeated encounters with political content. This finding is consistent with Hanifatunnisa and Lusiana (2025), who found that young Indonesians' information experiences during the political year were strongly connected to social media use and the presence of hoaxes. However, this study adds a more interpretive perspective by showing that participants did not simply "receive" political information; they experienced it as a persistent digital atmosphere that influenced their emotional relationship with politics. This suggests that political socialization among young citizens now occurs through algorithmic repetition, affective framing, and platform-driven visibility.

The emergence of distrust as an everyday interpretive habit is theoretically important because it complicates the assumption that skepticism is always democratically beneficial. Critical skepticism can protect young people from manipulation, but generalized distrust can weaken public confidence in democratic institutions. Participants' suspicion toward politicians, media, influencers, and anonymous accounts reflects a broader credibility crisis. This aligns with Siregar's (2025) findings on the negative effects of political buzzers, which suggest that coordinated political manipulation can reduce the quality of public communication. The present study adds that the impact of such manipulation is not limited to distorted information; it also changes how young people habitually interpret political messages.

The finding on verification fatigue offers a critical contribution to digital literacy debates. Many digital literacy programs assume that citizens can overcome disinformation by checking sources, comparing information, and consulting fact-checking platforms. While these practices are important, the participants' experiences show that verification itself can become exhausting when the information environment is overloaded and emotionally hostile. This finding corresponds with Yanuartha and Hergianasari's (2025) argument that democratic resilience requires more than individual media literacy; it also requires supportive educational, technological, and institutional ecosystems. Therefore, the burden of fighting disinformation should not be placed solely on young users.

Selective political disengagement provides another important insight. Previous research often celebrates social media as a space for youth participation, activism, and democratic expression. Nugroho (2025) shows that social media can strengthen youth participation in contemporary social movements. However, this study reveals that the same platforms can also encourage avoidance when political interaction becomes too risky, conflictual, or unreliable. This does not mean that young people are politically apathetic. Instead, many participants practiced what may

be called cautious engagement: they continued to care about political issues but limited their public expression to avoid misinformation, hostility, or social conflict.

The findings also support Putra et al.'s (2025) argument that Generation Z's digital political culture is connected to institutional trust deficits. However, this study adds that trust erosion is not always caused by direct dissatisfaction with government performance. In many cases, trust is weakened by repeated exposure to contradictory political narratives, unclear official communication, and the perception that digital political spaces are filled with manipulation. This means that public trust is shaped not only by institutional action but also by the communicative environment surrounding institutions. When the information environment becomes unstable, even accurate institutional messages may be received with doubt.

Culturally, the study shows that political disinformation becomes persuasive when it adapts to youth-oriented digital forms such as humor, satire, short videos, and emotionally resonant storytelling. This finding is relevant to the Indonesian context, where political communication often circulates through informal networks, group chats, religious-moral frames, and entertainment-based content. Mbuinga and Wantu (2025) show that social media plays an important role in shaping youth political perception, but this study further indicates that such perception is not only shaped by political messages themselves; it is also shaped by the cultural style through which those messages are delivered. The form of disinformation matters because young people often remember and share content that feels relatable, funny, shocking, or morally urgent.

Theoretically, this study contributes to the literature on digital political communication by proposing that the erosion of public trust among young citizens can be understood as a process involving exposure, suspicion, fatigue, and disengagement. This process-oriented interpretation helps move beyond linear explanations that treat disinformation exposure as directly producing distrust. Instead, distrust develops through repeated interpretive encounters in which young people try to make sense of uncertain political content. The study also contributes to youth political culture studies by showing that young people are neither passive victims of disinformation nor fully empowered digital citizens. They are active interpreters who negotiate truth, trust, and participation within a highly unstable media environment.

Practically, the findings suggest that interventions against political disinformation should combine digital literacy, transparent institutional communication, platform accountability, and youth-sensitive political education. Digital literacy programs should not only teach fact-checking skills but also address emotional manipulation, algorithmic awareness, source evaluation, and the social consequences of sharing political content. Election organizers, government agencies, and civil society organizations need to communicate in ways that are timely, clear, dialogic, and accessible to young audiences. Political education should also create safe spaces for young people to discuss uncertainty, distrust, and democratic participation without fear of ridicule or conflict.

Future research should examine this phenomenon across different regions, class backgrounds, educational levels, and platform cultures in Indonesia. Comparative studies between urban and rural youth could reveal whether the meaning of political disinformation differs according to local communication networks and media access. Further research may also focus on specific platforms such as TikTok, WhatsApp, Instagram, or X to understand how platform affordances shape trust and disinformation differently. Longitudinal qualitative studies would be especially useful for examining whether distrust among young people is temporary during election periods or becomes a more durable orientation toward democratic institutions.

4. Conclusions

This study concludes that political disinformation on social media contributes to the erosion of public trust among Indonesia's younger generation through a gradual and multilayered process. The main findings reveal four key patterns: algorithmic exposure to political content that is

difficult to avoid, the emergence of suspicion as a habitual way of interpreting political information, verification fatigue, and selective withdrawal from digital political discussion. These findings demonstrate that political disinformation does not merely produce informational confusion; it also shapes the social, emotional, and cognitive experiences through which young people understand politics, evaluate public actors, and construct trust in democratic institutions.

Theoretically, this study enriches the literature on digital political communication by showing that the erosion of public trust should be understood as an experiential process rather than as a direct consequence of exposure to false information. Practically and politically, the findings highlight the need for digital literacy initiatives that go beyond fact-checking and include algorithmic awareness, emotional resilience, ethical information-sharing, and transparent public communication. Government institutions, election organizers, educational institutions, digital literacy communities, and social media platforms need to develop a more credible and youth-responsive political information ecosystem. Future research is recommended to expand the geographical scope, compare experiences across different social groups, and examine platform-specific patterns of disinformation on TikTok, Instagram, X, WhatsApp, and YouTube.

References

- Asfari, D. Y., Ruslan, D. D., & Syahira, A. (2025). Students and fake news: Exploring digital literacy and information security among young adults. *CommVersa: Journal of Communication Studies*. <https://journals.ai-mrc.com/commversa/article/view/379>
- Dewi, E. A. S., & Sanofi, Z. (2025). Political communication preferences of Generation Z in West Java: Insights from an explanatory sequential study. *Journal of Adolescence and Youth*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02673843.2025.2512841>
- Hanifatunnisa, N. A., & Lusiana, E. (2025). Information experiences of young generation social media users in Indonesia's political year 2024. *Jurnal Kajian Informasi & Perpustakaan*. <https://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/jkip/article/view/55608>
- Hari, Y., Yanggah, M. E., & Paramita, A. S. (2025). Assessing novice voter resilience on disinformation during Indonesia elections 2024 with Naïve Bayes classifier. *Journal of Applied Data Sciences*. <https://www.bright-journal.org/Journal/index.php/JADS/article/view/489>
- Hayat, N., Maemunah, M., & Hidayati, S. (2025). Decoding Gen-Z voter reactions to political hoaxes: A deep dive into the 2024 Indonesian presidential election. *Jurnal Review Politik*. <https://jurnalufuf.uinsa.ac.id/index.php/JRP/article/view/3132>
- Hermawan, V. (2025). Political communication in the digital era: The role of social media in shaping public opinion in the 2024 election. *Jurnal Ilmiah Multidisiplin Indonesia*. <https://ejournal.seaninstitute.or.id/index.php/esaprom/article/view/6602>
- Irwanto, I., Bahfiarti, T., Unde, A. A., & Sonni, A. F. (2025). Information disorder's impact on adolescents: Publication trends and recommendations. *Frontiers in Communication*. <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/communication/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2025.1495536/full>
- Irwanto, I., Bahfiarti, T., Unde, A. A., & Sonni, A. F. (2025). Social network analysis of information flow and opinion formation on Indonesian social media: A case study of youth violence. *Adolescents*, 5(2), 18. <https://www.mdpi.com/2673-7051/5/2/18>
- Judijanto, L. (2025). Building civic engagement and national character through citizenship education: A review. *International Journal of Global Sustainable Research*. <https://slamultitechpublisher.my.id/index.php/ijgsr/article/view/81>
- Kulsum, N. M., Ginting, S., & Salim, A. (2025). Revisiting the public sphere: Communication, digital mobilization, and misinformation in Indonesia's 2019 and 2025 mass

- demonstrations. *Jurnal Komunikasi Ikatan Sarjana Komunikasi Indonesia*. <https://jurnal-iski.or.id/index.php/jkiski/article/view/1386>
- Kusumawardani, V., & Agustin, D. A. C. (2025). Social media and political preferences among Generation Z in the 2024 Indonesian general election. *Mediakita*. <https://jurnal.fuda.iainkediri.ac.id/index.php/mediakita/article/view/2762>
- Mbuinga, M. Y., & Wantu, S. M. (2025). Role of social media in shaping the political perception of youth in Tanggikiki Urban Village during the 2024 general election. *International Journal of Health, Economics, and Social Sciences*. <https://jurnal.unismuhpalu.ac.id/index.php/IJHESS/article/view/8088>
- Mujiburrahman, M., Joshi, J. S., Asbudi, A., & Muslem, M. (2025). Political information exposure in the 2024 Indonesian election: The case of Indonesian students in India. *Simulacra*. <https://journal.trunojoyo.ac.id/simulacra/article/view/31381>
- Muliyati, M., & Maharudin, D. (2025). Social media provocation and public opinion shifts in government policy evaluation: A PRISMA systematic review. *Research Horizon*. <http://journal.lifescifi.com/index.php/RH/article/view/843>
- Mukhtar, P. A., & Astini, P. D. (2025). Forensic linguistics on hoaxes on social media in the 2024 Indonesian presidential election campaign. *Architecture Image Studies*. <https://journals.ap2.pt/index.php/ais/article/view/683>
- Naharuddin, A., Yunas, L. D. P., & Maulana, A. H. (2025). The role of digital technology in enhancing political participation of the youth generation in the era of digital democracy. *Journal of the American Academy*. <https://americanjournal.us/index.php/american/article/view/60>
- Nugroho, B. H. (2025). Digital activism and youth participation in Indonesia: A qualitative study of social media's role in contemporary social movements. *Priviet Social Sciences Journal*. <http://journal.privietlab.org/index.php/PSSJ/article/view/603>
- Nurliah, N., Juwita, R., Boer, K. M., & Sari, K. A. (2025). Breaking down hoaxes in elections: Samarinda youth and students learn politics through the Sekolah Kebangsaan Tular Nalar-Mafindo. *Global Sustainability and Community Engagement*. <https://iesrjournal.com/index.php/gsce/article/view/228>
- Pramesti, O. L., Puspita, B. B., & Santoso, N. R. (2025). Democratic literacy of first-time voters in the 2024 election through social media consumption. *Profetik: Jurnal Komunikasi*. <https://journal.uin-suka.ac.id/isoshum/profetik/article/view/3083>
- Putra, I. P. H. J. (2025). Politics at the fingertips: Institutional trust deficit and Generation Z's digital political culture. *SHS Web of Conferences*. https://www.shs-conferences.org/articles/shsconf/abs/2025/12/shsconf_iclsse2025_02008/shsconf_iclsse2025_02008.html
- Putra, I. P. H. J., Wijaya, I. P. A. F. P., & Putra, I. B. S. A. (2025). Politics at the fingertips, trust at the horns: Institutional trust deficit and Generation Z's digital political culture in local election in Singaraja City. *Jurnal Media Komunikasi Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan*. <https://ejournal2.undiksha.ac.id/index.php/JMPPPKn/article/view/6232>
- Rahayu, P. B. (2025). Digital activism and public support in the post-truth era: Systematic review (2015–2025). *AICCON* 2025. <https://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/aiccon/article/view/47721>

- Samad, A. W., & Utama, Z. M. (2025). An analysis of the impact of the 2024 election on democracy in Indonesia. In *Selected Papers of WorldS4 2024*. Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-97-9324-2_14
- Satria, T., & Rahmawati, D. E. (2025). Social media and democracy in the digital era: “Desak Anies” capturing the hearts of young people’s participation in social media. *Jurnal Wacana Politik*, 10(1). <https://journal.unpad.ac.id/wacanapolitik/vol10/iss1/6/>
- Siregar, I. (2025). The negative effects of political buzzers on people’s communication intelligence: A case study of the 2014–2024 era in Indonesia. *Polit Journal: Scientific Journal of Politics*. <https://mail.biarjournal.com/index.php/polit/article/view/1303>
- Sjoraida, D. F., Bakti, I., Nugraha, A. R., & Subekti, P. (2025). Negotiating democracy through symbols and social media: A thematic analysis of political communication in West Java’s indigenous communities. *SAGE Open*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440251405174>
- Subekti, D., Yusuf, M., & Saadah, M. (2025). Social media and disinformation for candidates: The evidence in the 2024 Indonesian presidential election. *Frontiers in Political Science*. <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1625535/full>
- Sumarna, I., & Palupi, G. A. (2025). Exploring citizens’ lived experiences of trust in government communication amid digital disinformation. *CommVersa: Journal of Communication Studies*. <https://journals.ai-mrc.com/commversa/article/view/860>
- Surjatmodjo, D., Unde, A. A., Cangara, H., & Sonni, A. F. (2024). Information pandemic: A critical review of disinformation spread on social media and its implications for state resilience. *Social Sciences*, 13(8), 418. <https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/13/8/418>
- Wulandari, C. D., Abdul, M., & Tayibnapis, R. G. (2025). Disinformation on TikTok: Analyzing hoaxes surrounding the 2024 Indonesian election. *Jurnal Ekspresi dan Persepsi*. <https://ejournal.upnvj.ac.id/JEP/article/view/10163>
- Yanuartha, R. A., & Hergianasari, P. (2025). Digital citizenship and disinformation: The role of educational technology in strengthening democracy in Indonesia. *ICSSIET Congress*. https://www.icssiectcongress.com/_files/ugd/2a6f60_7157718e0ae141c7b7f0332e46397da6.pdf
- Zahirah, A. (2025). The role of citizens in countering disinformation and hate speech on social media. *Civitas: Jurnal Pembelajaran dan Ilmu Civic*. <https://jurnal.ulb.ac.id/index.php/civic/article/view/7353>